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Coexistence of Shill-Proof and Non-Shill-Proof Equilibria in a Public Auction
A single auction can have both a shill-proof equilibrium and a non-shill-proof equilibrium in the model of Komo, Kominers, and Roughgarden. We give an explicit single item example with three bidder positions, publicly observed actions, positive winning prices, and a strictly regular i.i.d.\ value di
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