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Subjective Performance Evaluation and Collusion
In many employment relationships, employees' contributions to firm value are not contractible. Firms therefore need to use alternative mechanisms to provide their employees with incentives. This paper investigates and contrasts two alternatives for a firm to provide effort incentives: (i) to subject
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