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Revenue Maximization in Choice-Based Matching Markets
The primary contribution of this paper resides in devising constant-factor approximation guarantees for revenue maximization in two-sided matching markets with general pairwise rewards. A major distinction between our work and state-of-the-art results in this context (Ashlagi et al., 2022; Torrico e
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