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Identity-Compatible Auctions
This paper studies sellers' and buyers' incentives to engage in shill bidding in single-object auctions. An auction is seller identity-compatible if the seller cannot profit by posing as one or more bidders through fictitious identities, and buyer identity-compatible if no buyer can profit by posing
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