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Identity, Incentives, and Cooperative Behavior for AI: Reverse-Engineering Multiagent Cooperation
The behavior of AI systems increasingly depends on the extent to which agents cooperate or coordinate with one another, in ways that may be desirable or not depending on the situation. Conventional explanations for cooperative behavior distinguish between purely other-regarding preferences ("altruis
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