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Formal Assurance for Railway Signalling: Expanding SAT Proof Checking to Certify Z3’s Inequality-Based SMT Proofs for ERTMS
Safety-critical railway systems such as Railway interlockings and the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) require strong, independently checkable guarantees of correctness. This requirement is reinforced by the new standard governing the use of software in the railway domain, EN50716 [ 1
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