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Likes, Budgets, and Equilibria: Designing Contests for Socially Optimal Advertising
We study competitive advertising on a social network. Each of $m$ firms allocates a budget across consumers, and a platform decides, through a contest success function (CSF), what share of each consumer's attention every firm captures; awareness then spreads through the network. We model awareness a
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