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Multiple-Player War of Attrition with Asymmetric Private Values
This paper studies a war of attrition over public good provision among multiple ex-ante asymmetric privately informed players. In equilibrium, asymmetry leads to a stratified behavior pattern in which at most one player provides the public good at time zero with a positive probability, while the oth
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