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Uniform-Price Mechanism Design for Automated Market Makers
Automated market makers (AMMs) are central to decentralized exchanges, but their reserve curves make mechanism design different from classical double auctions. We study a batch double auction with buyers, sellers, and a liquidity-nondecreasing AMM: post-trade reserves must have weakly larger product
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