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Partition function form games with probabilistic beliefs
We revisit games in partition function form, i.e. cooperative games where the payoff of a coalition depends on the partition of the entire set of players. We assume that each coalition computes its worth having probabilistic beliefs over the coalitional behavior of the outsiders, i.e., it assigns va
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