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Generalized Multidimensional Contests with Asymmetric Players: Equilibrium and Optimal Prize Design
We study $n$-dimensional Tullock contests between two players with heterogeneous effort costs. We establish sharp bounds on discriminatory power $r$ ensuring that equilibrium is unique and pure across prize rules and cost asymmetries: $r\leq1/\lceil n/2\rceil$ when prizes depend only on the number o
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