arXiv (All)
open access
Coarse Revenue Guarantee in First Price Auction and Beyond
I study the coarse revenue guarantee (CRG) of the single-unit first-price auction with common values. The CRG is the minimum expected revenue over all information structures and all Bayes coarse correlated equilibria (BCCE), the equilibrium notion to which no-regret learning leads. Identical play, i
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Competition in the Presence of Individual Demand Uncertainty#17125
- Prices, Bids, Values: One ML-Powered Combinatorial Auction to Rule Them All#149199
- XOR Bidding and Knapsack Formulations for HPC Network Resource Allocation#246482
- Bandwidth Fee Mechanisms for Certified Transaction Dissemination#1155632
- Protected domains and the cost of cooperation on weighted networks#1083225
Record · ID 1389847
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive