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After the Attacker Leaves: Benchmarking Carryover Attacks on LLM Agents
Modern LLM agents persist state across sessions via two channels: long-lived memory files silently prepended to the system prompt, and scheduled tasks waking the agent without user input. A one-time indirect prompt injection committed to either channel can re-fire across sessions long after the atta
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