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Differentiable Combinatorial Auction Design: Optimizing Revenue-Welfare-Fairness Frontiers With Graph Attention Networks
Designing optimal auctions for allocating public infrastructure-such as airport slots and energy resources-is challenging due to interdependent resources and complex side-constraints. While the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction guarantees maximum welfare, it cannot maximize revenue or accommodate
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