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Identifying level-$k$ reasoning in repeated games: Strategies, beliefs, and cognitive ability
In this paper, we identify level-$k$ reasoning in repeated games that operates at the level of a supergame strategy. First, we develop a model of level-$k$ reasoning that incorporates choices over strategies as well as beliefs about the strategies chosen by others. Then, jointly using elicited strat
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