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Consistent Opponent Modeling in Imperfect-Information Games
The goal of agents in multi-agent environments is to maximize total reward against the opposing agents that are encountered. Following a game-theoretic solution concept, such as Nash equilibrium, may obtain a strong performance in some settings; however, such approaches fail to capitalize on histori
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