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Computing Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Imperfect-Information Games
artificial-intelligencecomputer-science-and-game-theorymultiagent-systemspopulations-and-evolutiontheoretical-economics
We present an algorithm for computing evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) in symmetric two-player perfect-recall extensive-form games of imperfect information. The algorithm operates directly in sequence form, avoiding explicit enumeration of normal-form supports. In a biologically motivated can
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