arXiv (All)
open access
A Factor-6 Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanism for Cascade Position Auctions
Position auctions require assigning advertisers to positions and determining their display order. Under cascade behavior, earlier clicks prevent users from reaching later placements, coupling the click probabilities of selected advertisements. Existing methods achieve constant-factor welfare approxi
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Improved Combinatorial Auctions with and without Samples#1342732
- Arctic Auctions, Linear Fisher Markets, and Rational Convex Programs#665588
- Arctic Auctions, Linear Fisher Markets, and Rational Convex Programs#664088
- A Note on EFX Inapproximability for Chores#1155208
- Subquadratic Subsidies for Nonnegative or Nonpositive Valuations#985643
Record · ID 1456530
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive