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Self-Confirming Equilibrium under Model Misspecification
We study the steady states of games played recurrently within large anonymous populations of players who receive partial ex-post feedback about the play of their opponents. Departing from the classical Bayesian account, players do not trust their conjectures as a correct description of the strategic
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