arXiv (All)
open access
Bayesian Replicator Dynamics and the Inversion of Strict Dominance in Bimatrix Games
Replicator dynamics, the central model of evolutionary game theory, describe populations evolving under selection and agents learning by trial and error. They also admit a third use: continuous-time Bayesian inference, in which an agent planning against an opponent accumulates evidence for each cand
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- The mathematical journey of spatial reciprocity#1458631
- Network Intervention by Polling Strategic Agents#1218082
- The Turner Problem: Relationality and the Limits of Algorithmic Morality#732294
- Complexity of spatial games#1066565
- Optimization Models for Reaction Networks: Information Divergence, Quadratic Programming and Kirchhoff’s Laws.#770837
Record · ID 1467669
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive