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Nash Incentive-compatible Online Mechanism Learning via Weakly Differentially Private Online Learning
computer-science-and-game-theorycryptography-and-securitydata-structures-and-algorithmsmachine-learning
We study a multi-round mechanism design problem, where we interact with a set of agents over a sequence of rounds. We wish to design an incentive-compatible (IC) online learning scheme to maximize an application-specific objective within a given class of mechanisms, without prior knowledge of the ag
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