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Optimal Auction Design for Constrained Buyers
We study single-parameter, multi-buyer auctions in which buyers are subject to constraints that affect their bidding strategy. Such constraints arise in many real-world auction settings and fundamentally alter the auction design space: the revelation principle, envelope theorem, and Myerson's lemma
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