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First-Order Bilevel Optimization for Non-truthful Auction Design
Automated mechanism design has enabled the learning of complex auction mechanisms using neural networks. However, designing non-truthful auctions remains challenging because bidders' equilibrium strategies depend on the auction mechanism and thus evolve as the mechanism is optimized. In this work,
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