The Capacity for Otherwise Provisional Stabilization and Constitutive Exchange in an Erosive Field

Background/Rationale. The Niami framework of finite continuance holds that existence is not a path toward a final essence but a bounded process obliged to preserve its own capacity for reconfiguration against continuous erosion. Every being therefore emerges as a provisional stabilization within an erosive field, while constitutive exchange with an environment renders that stabilization possible. Two prior manuscripts extended this thesis independently. One developed a process-ontological line drawing on Simondon, Prigogine, Maturana and Varela, Luhmann, and Nancy. The other developed a phenomenological, daseinsanalytic, and existential-psychoanalytic line drawing on Husserl, Heidegger, Medard Boss, Wittgenstein, and Deleuze. Neither extension had previously been examined in relation to the other. Aim. This article integrates both lines into a single architecture and asks what changes when a structural subject capable of experience, language, and world-disclosure is described through the combined vocabulary of open, far-from-equilibrium systems theory and phenomenological ontology. Approach. The article proceeds comparatively rather than eclectically. Each interlocutor is assigned a distinct explanatory register and assessed along explicit dimensions of convergence and divergence from finite continuance, including direction of process, normative valence, openness, and terminal versus chronic finitude. Borrowed vocabulary is therefore not permitted to substitute for the framework's own normative commitments. Each comparison is also classified as either an analogy, which carries no ontological commitment beyond its source domain, or an ontological transfer, which does. This distinction keeps illustrative and substantive borrowing conceptually separate. Findings. The comparison yields five consolidated results. First, constitutive exchange is specified through four dimensions: recognition, structural position, pre-determinate capacity, and world-disclosure. Second, the threshold of sufficiency and homeorhesis are restated relationally, as environment-dependent properties rather than internal traits of an isolated subject. Homeorhesis is consequently understood as a return to a viable trajectory rather than to a fixed set-point. Third, the criterion for distinguishing automatic, dynamic, and pseudo-dynamic masking is revised through a three-way test that combines dispositional and perturbation-based assessment with a daseinsanalytic examination of whether openness to the world expands or contracts under reconfiguration. Fourth, the article introduces phenomenological reconfiguration-capacity as a concept naming the subject's capacity to alter not only its determinations but also the manner in which self, other, world, body, time, and possibility are disclosed. Fifth, these results are converted into a clinical architecture consisting of a five-domain map of reconfiguration-capacity, a three-stage perturbation-testing procedure organized around the automatic, dynamic, and pseudo-dynamic distinction, and an outcome ledger that evaluates improvement partly through changes in this classification rather than through symptom reduction alone. Implications and Limitations. The synthesis is normatively load-bearing rather than merely descriptive. It does not derive the claim that reconfiguration-capacity ought to be defended from physical, biological, or phenomenological sources. Instead, it treats this claim as an independent practical commitment that the comparative analysis clarifies and develops without pretending to derive it. The clinical vocabulary developed here, including erosive governance, automatic and dynamic masking, and phenomenological reconfiguration-capacity, is offered at the level of existential-structural description consistent with the Daseinsanalytic tradition. It is not presented as a substitute for empirically validated diagnostic o