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Optimal climate policy in incomplete electricity markets
Incomplete long-term contracting in electricity markets can expose investors and consumers to inefficient levels of risk. This paper investigates how incompleteness impacts the optimal choice of climate policy. We develop a game-theoretic model of optimal policy-making in anticipation of how electri
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