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The Constructibility Criterion: Mechanism Specification as a Precondition for Falsifiability
Karl Popper’s falsifiability criterion presupposes that the mechanism connecting a proposition’s premises to its predictions is at least categorially specified. This paper makes that presupposition explicit and argues that it constitutes a logical precondition for falsifiability. When mechanism category is undefined rather than merely unknown, localization of a negative test result becomes not practically difficult but logically impossible—generating pseudo-falsifiability. An epistemic unboundedness argument shows that undefined mechanisms provide no constrained search domain, blocking Bayesian confirmation as surely as Popperian falsification. The paper introduces compound constructibility failure for propositions with multiple undefined mechanism stages, and shows that a class of philosophical thought experiments resolve into tractable decision problems once their mechanism specifications are supplied—the paradox transformation. The criterion is positioned relative to Popper, Duhem–Quine, Salmon, Woodward, and the new mechanists.
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