A OBJETIVIDADE DA MORAL EM JOHN SEARLE

In this research, we evaluate whether John Searle's biological naturalism offers consistent bases for an objective morality. For this, first, we define the concepts of morality, objectivity and naturalism that we use, in order to avoid misunderstandings and ambiguities, as well as we deal with the basic concepts of Searlean's philosophy of mind – the self-titled biological naturalism. Next, we assess why external realism is a condition of possibility for moral realism. In this sense, we examine how John Searle defends that anti-realism is irrational. Subsequently, we approach Searlean's theory of action, especially the explanation of how rational action takes place, according to him. Then, we assess whether Searle was successful when faced with the objections about whether one can derive an 'ought' from an 'is', as he considers his philosophical system to be naturalistic. Next, we examine whether the objectivity of morality can be obtained from John Searle's philosophical framework, as the linguistic act of predicating takes precedence over universal terms. We defend that evaluative predicates tend to become more perfected when we use the formula of constitutive rules in the field of morality, in order to increasingly include other human beings, in an equitable way, decreasing, rationally – and through collective intentionality –, the moral disagreements between groups and individuals, which implies the rational recognition of Universal Human Rights. Given this, we argue that actions and values of particular groups can be respected as long as they respect the general contract, constituted by collective intentionality, through rational recognition. We argue that, as a characteristic of intentionality, rationality does not exist without life, and, therefore, it has intrinsic value. We deduce that the objectivity of morality can be obtained from John Searle's philosophical framework, as, in the repeated application of the constitutive rules, the evaluative predicates tend to become more perfected, with the equitable inclusion of the totality of human beings, as subjects of rights and obligations, in assigning the status of human beings. This lessens moral disagreements between groups and individuals through collective intentionality. The condition of possibility of morality, in this sense, is language itself as a basic social institution. Language, as a logical delimiter, and altruism, as a logical requirement for what is right and wrong, would be the generalizers of the application of moral terms. Thus, not only the dimension of rationality, but all the other dimensions that potentially make up the self and the other must be considered altruistically in a properly good action. Therefore, pragmatically, the agent's actions, as they do not exist out of context, must also consider that the others – as individuals and as a collective – also develop in such a way that they can give themselves their own ends. Finally, based on Searle's thesis of how a social reality and social and institutional facts are possible, we conclude that there is a way to derive an objective morality.