◉ The Moral Grammar Exit: Eliminativist Moral Non-Realism, Pro-Social Evaluation, and the Replacement of Moralized Control

Moral non-realism faces a practical question after its negative case is made: what should people say and do if moral predicates do not report a special realm of categorical facts? Moralized verdicts commonly combine several distinguishable acts—describing harm, expressing attitudes, invoking trust or coordination, positioning power, and recommending a response—while presenting the bundle as one authoritative property. This paper compares four policies toward that grammar: robust realist retention, expressivist retention, error-theoretic fictionalism, and explicit replacement. It develops a translation protocol that asks speakers to state affected interests, consent and exit, cooperative expectations, power relations, evidence, goals, and proposed interventions. The main result is conditional but substantive. When translation preserves warning, protection, coordination, and motivation while making assumptions and tradeoffs easier to inspect, public reasoning has a defeasible reason to retire the moralized form. Research on moral-emotional communication supplies a limited supporting strand: such language can spread rapidly within ideological networks and, in specific protest settings, track support for violence. Those findings do not show that all moral language is harmful or that replacement will always work. Strong objections also remain: realist authority may be genuine, expressivist grammar may efficiently coordinate attitudes, fiction may preserve useful commitments, and replacement vocabularies can smuggle values or burden vulnerable speakers. The appropriate conclusion is therefore a deployment rule, not universal linguistic prohibition: translate where the practical functions survive and accountability improves; retain or redesign the form where they do not. Eliminativism can preserve humane seriousness, but it must earn that claim in use.