Psychologizing, Authority, and Propaganda

When should we dismiss the reasons agents give for their views and instead invoke alternative psychological or causal explanations for their behavior? Philosophers such as Amy Flowerree and Nicholas Smyth have recently argued that we should generally avoid such dismissive psychologizing of individuals on moral grounds. In this paper, I critique these views and argue that the morality of psychologizing depends crucially on the formal authority an agent possesses. This psychologizing is not only permissible on my view, but even recommended in light of an agent’s formal authority. I advocate for the following principle: we should default to psychologizing agents who occupy powerful formal positions of authority, while we should be comparatively more hesitant to psychologize those outside of such positions. Psychologizing the non-formally authoritative does carry a certain moral and political risk. It can encourage political disenfranchisement, denying others full-fledged, equal participation in political life because they are taken to lack the necessary rational capacity for this participation. This is a possibility that researchers in particular should contend with. My discussion draws out implications for understanding propagandistic threats, academic research on epistemic behavior, defenses of epistocracy, and the moral dimensions of our epistemic lives.