On SSI-based Private Decentralized Bidding

arXiv:2608.22525v1 [cs.CR] 23 Aug 2026

On SSI-based Private Decentralized Bidding 1st Andreea-Elena Drăgnoiu

2nd Nicoleta Dumitru

3rd Ruxandra F. Olimid

Department of Computer Science University of Bucharest Research Institute of the University of Bucharest (ICUB) Bucharest, Romania andreea-elena.panait@drd.unibuc.ro

Department of Mathematics University of Bucharest Research Institute of the University of Bucharest (ICUB) Bucharest, Romania nicoleta.dumitru@my.fmi.unibuc.ro

Department of Computer Science University of Bucharest Research Institute of the University of Bucharest (ICUB) Bucharest, Romania ruxandra.olimid@fmi.unibuc.ro

Abstract—Private bidding is a process in which participants submit sealed bids, ensuring that their content remains hidden from other bidders during the bidding window. This is essential in competitive environments to ensure a fair and independent evaluation of all proposals. While (public) blockchain enables decentralized bidding and its transparency offers advantages such as public verifiability, without a Trusted Third Party (TTP), current methods struggle to verify whether a bidder is eligible. We propose a framework that leverages Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) to address these issues by certifying the bid’s eligibility and authenticity using the now-established SSI framework. To allow participants to prove they meet the requirements while keeping their bids secret, our model uses Verifiable Credentials (VCs) and cryptographic primitives such as Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs). Index Terms—Decentralized identity, Blockchain, Private Bidding

I. I NTRODUCTION Within the context of Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI), this study considers bidding as a decentralized mechanism for selecting among competing proposals. In this framework, participants, acting as self-sovereign agents, submit sealed bids derived from their own Verifiable Credentials (VCs) and locally controlled data in response to a predefined request. These submissions are evaluated according to fixed criteria, and a single winner is determined without any iterative interaction or negotiation among participants. This sealed-bid setting is particularly relevant in privacy-sensitive and adversarial environments, as it ensures that each participant’s strategy is based solely on privately held information, capabilities, and cryptographically verifiable claims, rather than observing or reacting to other bidders. Although bidding and auction are often used interchangeably in everyday language, in a technical context, there is a clear distinction between them. An auction is a dynamic, competitive, and interactive process that allows for the continued placement of bids, followed by the response of the other bidders over the duration of the auction, in a number of rounds. In contrast to the one-time submission characteristic of bidding, auctions involve real-time feedback and sequential price adjustments, culminating in the selection of a winner at the end of the process. This study focuses exclusively on bidding because of its linear, formally structured nature.

This bidding scenario is especially suitable for blockchainbased applications. The decentralized architecture of blockchain enables the creation of a secure and immutable record of each bid, ensuring that submissions cannot be altered once recorded. In addition, smart contracts can automate the evaluation and selection process according to predefined rules. As a result, the procedure becomes transparent, verifiable, and independent of centralized control, thereby reducing the need for trust among participants. Ultimately, this approach strengthens procedural integrity and ensures that outcomes are determined solely by objective, pre-programmed criteria. A. Motivation The classical, decentralized commit-reveal scheme on blockchain, while an improvement over the centralized bidding, still has a significant weakness: the blockchain is transparent by default, meaning that participants’ identities (generally anonymized) and, once revealed, bid values become permanently public. In competitive settings, this creates real risks (a losing bidder’s strategy, capabilities, and valuation are exposed to all future competitors). More critically, the system lacks a mechanism to verify who is actually bidding. Anyone can submit a commitment, meaning eligibility, reputation, and authorization cannot be enforced without reintroducing a Trusted Third Party (TTP). By using SSI, participants hold and control their own verifiable credentials, selectively disclosing only what is necessary to prove eligibility without revealing anything beyond what the policy requires. B. Novelty and Contributions To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose incorporating the established SSI framework into private bidding and thus making use of its advantages in these settings. Our work brings the following main contributions: 1) We consider SSI-based private bidding and define a general framework. 2) We compare our proposed framework to the existing general framework for private bidding. 3) We explicitly look into various properties (classified on several classes) and their satisfyability within the two frameworks.

C. Outline The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses related work. Section III introduces SSI. Section IV presents the classical, general framework for private bidding using the blockchain and the enhanced framework that takes advantage of the SSI functionality. Section V highlights the properties of such frameworks in comparison. Section VI briefly discusses our proposal. Section VII concludes. II. R ELATED WORK Several blockchain-based auction protocols have been proposed over the years. However, none combines private bidding with SSI capabilities. Kosba et al. [1] used Multi-Party Computation (MPC) but with high interaction costs, while Yuan et al. [2] used TEE, which requires hardware updates and has security concerns [3], [4]. Other works rely on semi-trusted auctioneers [5], suffer from inefficiency and lack fund verification on Ethereum [6], cannot support sealed-bid auctions [7], or allow bidder collusion [8]. In [9], the authors introduce a blockchain-based sealed-bid domain name auction protocol that uses smart contracts, the Pedersen commitment, and Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs). The domain name bidder can bid in a Vickrey auction type that allows the bidder to keep the bid secret until all bids are submitted, and the winning bidder pays the second-highest bid instead of his bid [9]. A privacy-preserving sealed-bid auction protocol using TEE execution and on-chain settlement [10], demonstrated on Ethereum and SUAVE. It achieves confidentiality and verifiable results without trusted intermediaries or protocol changes. Despite some residual trust and typical TEE security risks, the protocol shows that practical private auctions for DeFi applications are feasible today [10]. In [11], a Homomorphic Encryption (HE)-based bid comparison circuit was designed to determine the winning bid in a sealed-bid auction while allowing bidders to verify the computation without revealing their bids. Based on this circuit, a Blockchain-based Sealed-bid Scheme (BSS) using commitments and zero-knowledge proofs was proposed. The scheme was formally proven secure against bid leakage and winner manipulation, and its performance is evaluated to assess efficiency and practicality. [12] presents a blockchain-based electronic bidding auction system that protects privacy and resists malicious participants. It uses secure MPC and threshold elliptic curve cryptography to eliminate the need for a TTP. The protocol is proven secure and shown through simulations to be efficient and practical. In [13], the authors propose a blockchain-based framework that prevents online auctions from shill bidding behaviour through dynamic, behaviour-based penalties enforced by smart contracts. Using a Bid Shill Score (BSS) to evaluate nine bidding patterns, the system adjusts penalties to make fraudulent activity economically unprofitable while ensuring fair competition. The study [14] analyzes privacy-preserving cryptographic mechanisms for blockchain platforms, especially for Ethereum, and proposes an anonymous auction protocol based on Anon-Zether [15]. Implemented through a smart contract in Solidity, the protocol hides both bidders’ identities and bid

amounts while an auctioneer determines the result. Although this higher anonymity increases gas costs compared to some sealed-bid auctions, it remains cheaper than fully decentralized approaches without an auctioneer. The paper [16] presents a sealed-bid auction protocol that hides both the bid value and the maximum bid while ensuring bidders have sufficient funds (fund binding). It uses indistinguishable Ethereum transactions and the DECO protocol [17] to prove fund availability without revealing sensitive information, and evaluates the implementation against deposit-based auction methods. In [18], the authors propose a decentralized, smart contract–based sealedbid reverse auction that claims to preserve bid privacy, resist collusion, and require no trusted third party. Using ZKPs and anonymous veto networks, it ensures security and verifiability, with efficient performance demonstrated on an Ethereumbased prototype. [19] introduces practical, fully decentralized sealed-bid auction protocols using timed commitments. These ensure fairness even with dropouts or collusion, while keeping bids hidden. The scheme includes non-malleable commitments with range proofs to verify sufficient funds, enabling penalties for abandoned bids and support for multiple auctions. An Ethereum-based implementation shows the approach is efficient and practical. [20] proposes BERA, a blockchainbased system for securely allocating edge computing resources. It combines a sealed-bid auction using Ethereum smart contracts and privacy-preserving techniques with a graph neural network to detect fraud without revealing bids. In [21], the authors propose BCCIBI, a blockchain-based scheme to improve e-auction security and privacy. It combines multiple cryptographic techniques, such as ElGamal encryption, BLS signatures, and ZKPs, to ensure bid confidentiality, bidder anonymity, and secure verification. III. S ELF -S OVEREIGN I DENTITY (SSI) Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) is a digital identity model that empowers individuals with control over their identities. This framework uses a decentralized approach to enable privacypreserving, context-dependent (personal) data sharing, which significantly mitigates the risks of identity theft and reduces reliance on centralized third parties [22]. The SSI ecosystem functions through a structured three-party model involving distinct roles and digital artifacts [23]. The holder, typically the user, owns and manages their identity data within a digital wallet. The Authority, or issuer, is the entity responsible for creating and cryptographically signing assertions about the holder. To complete the transaction, the verifier validates these assertions by checking the proof against a Verifiable Data Registry (VDR)—often a blockchain—to ensure the information is authentic and has not been revoked [22]. The data exchanged within this ecosystem takes the form of Verifiable Credentials (VCs) and Verifiable Presentations (VPs). A VC is a digital, tamper-evident proof of specific claims that includes cryptographic metadata and the signature of the issuer [22]. While VCs are typically stored off-chain to maintain user privacy, they are used to generate a VP, which is the actual data shared with a verifier. This mechanism

allows the holder to present only the necessary information for a specific context, ensuring that private data remains secure while still being verifiable across different platforms [22], [23]. IV. P RIVATE D ECENTRALIZED B IDDING F RAMEWORKS We further discuss the general private bidding framework that uses blockchain, as already presented in the literature [13], [18], [9], [24]. Then, we propose an SSI-based framework, which brings in the advantages of self-sovereignty and makes the best use of the already established SSI framework. A. General Private Bidding (on Blockchain) The general framework involves three primary functions: a requestor, a group of bidders, and a smart contract that governs their interactions on a public blockchain. Note that the terminology is not fully settled in the literature; for example, [18] refers to an actioneer and multiple bidders, [9] refers to domain name owner and domain name bidders, and [13] refers to a seller, who owns the item, multiple bidders, and an auctioneer, who conducts the bidding procedure. The main reason for using a public blockchain is to simplify the bidding process by allowing any bidder the possibility to place a bid, without any approval or initial interaction with the requestor that runs the bidding, while also making the overall process transparent and publicly verifiable. Requestor. The requestor is the entity that runs the bidding, and it is directly interested in the result. The requestor initiates the process by deploying a smart contract that encodes all bidding logic, eligibility rules, evaluation criteria, and timing constraints. Once deployed, this contract is immutable and executes autonomously. The requestor has no further privileged control over the outcome. Smart contract. The contract acts as the neutral coordinator of the entire process. It enforces the sequencing of phases, validates incoming submissions, timestamps, and stores all data on-chain, and ultimately determines and publishes the winner according to its predefined logic. Bidders. Each bidder participates independently, placing its own bid. This is performed by executing the smart contract. Bidders have no visibility into each other’s submissions values at any point in the process. A bid can contain a single value or more, depending on the requirements. The winning bid is the one that meets the requirements best, with the clearing price being the price that the winning bidders pay. The process unfolds in three sequential phases, as depincted in Figure 1. 1. Deployment Phase. The requestor publishes the smart contract, establishing the rules and opening the bidding window, a predefined time period during which bidders can submit their bids. 2. Commitment Phase. Each bidder constructs a cryptographic commitment (e.g., a hash of their bid value combined with a secret nonce) and submits it to the contract. Due to the properties of the commitment, the commitment value does not expose the bid value (the hiding property), while preventing

its modification (the binding property). The contract records each submission with a timestamp, ensuring integrity and immutability. 3. Reveal Phase. After the bidding window closes, the bidders disclose their original bid values and nonces. The smart contract layer verifies the commitments, and only bids that pass this verification are accepted to evaluation. This step is necessary because the blockchain’s inherent transparency would otherwise allow late bidders to observe and undercut earlier submissions. The smart contract layer then applies its predefined selection and announces the winner on-chain. We leave out of the discussion here how exactly the bidders open their commitments; a straightforward way is for the bidders to open their commitments publicly, and the requestor to trigger an end-auction transaction on the smart contract to finalize the process. B. SSI-based Private Bidding (on Blockchain) In SSI-based settings, bidders act as holders of VCs issued by trusted authorities that attest relevant claims, such as identity, certifications, financial capacity, or eligibility requirements. These credentials allow bidders to participate without relying on a centralized authority to validate them during the auction process. Similarly to the general framework, we maintain the same actors and unfold the process in three sequential phases, as depicted in Figure 2. 1. Deployment Phase. It maintains the same goal as in the classical framework, but explicitly enforces, at the verifier (smart contract) level, a policy specifying which claims a bidder must prove to demonstrate eligibility to submit an offer. 2. Bidding Phase. This phase extends the Commitment phase in that, to place a bid, a bidder must first explicitly prove its eligibility under the enforced policy. While the Eligibility verification and Bid submission can be merged, we present them as different steps for clarity. Eligibility verification. Before submitting an offer, the bidder must prove eligibility. For this, the bidder constructs a VP from one or more VCs. By using special cryptographic constructions, such as the BBS+ signature scheme, the verifier learns only the necessary information while all other attributes remain hidden. This is called selective disclosure. The bidder signs the VP and submits it to the verifier, which validates the credentials and confirms eligibility. Only eligible bidders are allowed to proceed. Bid submission. Once eligibility is confirmed, the bidder submits the actual bid. To preserve bid confidentiality, the bidder submits a commitment (e.g., Pedersen commitment) to the bid value. This commitment hides the bid value while preventing changes to its value (the binding property and binding it to the bidder (in particular, to its identity) by executing a transaction. Additionally, a ZKP can be attached to prove that the committed bid satisfies predefined auction rules (e.g., valid range or format) without revealing the exact data.

Fig. 1. General bidding on blockchain. The protocol proceeds in three phases: (1) Deployment Phase - the requestor deploys the bidding logic; (2) Commitment Phase - bidders submit cryptographic commitments during the open window; (3) Reveal Phase - bidders reveal their actual values after the window closes, enabling the smart contract to verify, evaluate, and announce the winner without the necessity of a TTP.

Fig. 2. SSI-based Bidding, an SSI-augmented commit-reveal framework in which eligibility is enforced cryptographically rather than by the necessity of a TTP. The protocol proceeds in three phases: (1) Deployment Phase - the requestor deploys the bidding logic, including an eligibility policy in the smart contract; (2) Bidding Phase - during the open window, bidders submit cryptographic commitments as well as eligibility and identity proofs in forms of VPs; (3) Winner Selection - after the bidding window closes, the contract validates all proofs, evaluates the sealed bids, and publishes the winner on-chain, preserving both bidder privacy and result verifiability.

Bid validation and storage. The smart contract records only valid bid commitments after verifying both the VP and the accompanying proofs. In this way, the blockchain does not store sensitive bidder information or plain text bid values, but only cryptographic proofs or commitments that guarantee correctness and fairness. 3. Winner Selection. During the final phase, which is similar to the Reveal phase, the winner is selected. Only the winner’s identifier (possibly anonymized) and the clearing price are published. To achieve this, privacy-preserving mechanisms to determine the winner can be set in place. Unlike classical auction schemes, where smart contracts

mainly act as record keepers, the SSI-based model introduces active verification of bidder eligibility before bids are recorded, and makes direct use of certification of attributes in forms of VCs/VPs. Adversarial model. The adversarial threat is naturally defined in the bidding systems, with a focus on the bidders. While the smart contract itself can be a point of attack, the requestor is considered honest. The reason is that dishonest requesters could directly enforce eligibility or winning criteria to their advantage anyway. A weak adversary is a passive, honest-but-curious entity seeking to disclose restricted information from the bidding process, such as the real identities of

the bidders, the final ranking, or the bid values (also during the bidding phase). A stronger active, malicious adversary that attempts to place bids adaptively to maximize winning bids or to impersonate another party by stealing or cloning VPs is allowed. Coalitions of mallicious parties are naturally allowed.

Fabric uses chaincode written in Go, Java, or Node.js. The nature of the blockchain used (public vs. private) should be further analyzed. The cryptographic mechanisms can be implemented using tools like Circom, snakjs, or ZoKrates. The frontend layer can use frameworks like React or Angular.

V. P ROPERTIES

VII. CONCLUSIONS

We further investigate properties of interest for private decentralized bidding. Table I summarizes the results, describing these properties and marking their satisfaction for both the general private bidding framework and the SSIbased private bidding framework. We divided the properties into the following categories based on their type: Privacy & Data Protection, Identity, Trust & Governance, Security & Performance, and Correctness & Verifiability.

We have proposed an SSI-based bidding framework that incorporates SSI’s features into a general bidding system running on the blockchain. We have investigated the advantages SSI brings in terms of privacy, security, verifiability, and trust, compared to the classical, general decentralized bidding framework. Our analysis shows the superiority of the proposed model, which provides stronger security guarantees and simplifies verifications such as identity and eligibility checks, while preserving data privacy and enabling selective disclosure. Moreover, SSI brings in standardization, as SSI is now a well-established field and its adoption is clearly defined by current regulations. Our current work is pioneering SSI-based bidding and is limited to defining the framework, informally discussing its benefits, and introducing a technical implementation flavor. A prototype or a more in-depth technical discussion of tools and primitives to be used in such a solution is subject to future work.

VI. D ISCUSSION Intuitively, general private bidding on the blockchain hides bid values and ensures a fair bidding process. However, its correct termination assumes honest bidders in the sense that they place correct bids, e.g., do not bid more than they can pay. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the bidders have the funds to pay the clearance price. This is solved in the SSI-based framework by zk-proving that the bidder owns the necessary funds, in the form of a VC/VP (Data verifiability in Table I). Also, SSI-based identification fully maintains Decentralization (also for identification and eligibility checks) while enforcing Self-Sovereignty: the bidder is fully in charge of their own identity and uses selective disclosure to prove only the necessary attributes to establish their eligibility in the bidding process. Fully eliminating the need for a TTP increases overall Trust in the system, and Selective disclosure limits data exposure, thereby directly facilitating other properties, such as Unlinkability. This shows the superiority of the proposed framework in terms of privacy and data protection, security, correctness and verifiability, trust, and naturally, identity management and self-sovereignity. Moreover, the SSI framework is well-established and standardized [25], [26], while the bidding process is not, suffering from a lack of unified rules and platform fragmentation. Thus, using the SSI framework for bidding might facilitate similar adoption and provide a standardized method for certifying bids. This directly reduces the assumed trust level, thereby increasing confidence in an honest and fair bidding process. Technically, an SSI-based bidding system can be implemented through the integration of an SSI framework, blockchain infrastructure, and other cryptographic tools. The SSI layer relies on W3C standards [25], [26], that should be managed using a framework such as Hyperledger Aries, Hyperledger Indy, or Veramo. These frameworks are usually integrated in backend services developed in Node.js, Python, or Java, and should use digital wallets to allow bidders to store and present credentials. The execution layer can be implemented on blockchain platforms, like Ethereum or Hyperledger Fabric, with smart contracts being commonly written in Solidity for Ethereum-based systems, while Hyperledger

ACKNOWLEDGMENT This work was supported by a grant of the Ministry of Research, Innovation and Digitalization, CNCS/CCCDI - UEFISCDI, project number ERANET-CHISTERA-IV-PATTERN, within PNCDI IV. R EFERENCES [1] A. E. Kosba, A. K. Miller, E. Shi, Z. A. Wen, and C. Papamanthou, “Hawk: The blockchain model of cryptography and privacy-preserving smart contracts,” 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pp. 839–858, 2016. [Online]. Available: https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:1869596 [2] R. Yuan, Y.-B. Xia, H.-B. Chen, B.-Y. Zang, and J. Xie, “Shadoweth: Private smart contract on public blockchain,” Journal of Computer Science and Technology, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 542–556, 2018. [Online]. Available: https://www.sciopen.com/article/10.1007/s11390-018-1839-y [3] Shaun Davenport and Richard Ford, “Sgx: The good, the bad and the downright ugly,” 2014, https://www.virusbulletin.com/virusbulletin/2014/01/sgx-good-badanddownright- ugly. Last Accessed: March 2026. [4] JP Aumasson and Luis Merino, “Sgx secure enclaves in practice security and crypto review,” 2016, https://blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us16-Aumasson-SGX-Secure-Enclaves-In-Practice-Security-And-CryptoReview-wp.pdf. Last Accessed: March 2026. [5] E.-O. Blass and F. Kerschbaum, “Strain: A secure auction for blockchains,” in European Symposium on research in computer security. Springer, 2018, pp. 87–110. [6] H. S. Galal and A. M. Youssef, “Verifiable sealed-bid auction on the ethereum blockchain,” Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/704, 2018. [Online]. Available: https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/704 [7] T. D. Nguyen and M. T. Thai, “A blockchain-based iterative double auction protocol using multiparty state channels,” ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT), vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 1–22, 2021. [8] H. Qusa, J. Tarazi, and V. Akre, “Secure e-auction system using blockchain: Uae case study,” in 2020 Advances in Science and Engineering Technology International Conferences (ASET). IEEE, 2020, pp. 1–5.

TABLE I C OMPARISON OF P ROPERTIES : G ENERAL F RAMEWORK VS . SSI- BASED F RAMEWORK Property Name

Type

Description

Privacy of losing bids [21]

Privacy & Data Protection

Anonymity [23]

Privacy & Data Protection Privacy & Data Protection Privacy & Data Protection Privacy & Data Protection Identity

Only the winning bid is disclosed, the bids submitted by participants who do not win the auction remain confidential and are not revealed to others The identities of the bidders are kept hidden during the bidding process Individual bids cannot be linked to the identity of the bidder or to other bids made by the same bidder. Bidders retain control and rights over the data they submit during bidding A bidder reveals only the specific credential attributes required to qualify for or participate in a bid Bidders have full ownership and control over their personal data, identity, or assets, and decide with whom to share the data Holders can present VPs without being dependent on or traceable back to the original issuer during the bidding process VCs issued in different ecosystems can be presented and recognized across multiple, unrelated bidding environments Verifying the identity of participants before they are allowed to take part in the bidding process Confirm the eligibility of bidders to take part within the bidding process Confidence of the participants that the bidding process is honest, fair, and will be executed as promised A bidding system remains active, responsive, and capable of progressing toward a valid outcome, even in the presence of failures, uncooperative participants, or adversarial conditions Maintain performance, correctness, and efficiency as the number of bidders, bids, or auction complexity grows Distribution of control, authority, and execution across multiple independent parties Mechanisms used in bidding systems to identify and prevent dishonest or illegal activities during the bidding process A bidder cannot later deny having submitted, agreed to, or authorized a bid Ensures the bid is accurate, complete, and error-free before submission Independently confirm the accuracy and authenticity of data used in bidding processes The ability of anyone to independently verify that a bidding process was conducted correctly, without accessing confidential bid details

Unlinkability [23] Data Ownership [23] Selective Disclosure [22], [23] Self-Sovereignty [23], [22] Issuer Credential Independence [22], [23] Credential Portability [21], [23] Identity verification [21], [23] Eligibility Check

Identity Identity Trust & Governance Trust & Governance

Overall trust [23]

Trust & Governance

Aliveness [21]

Security & Performance

Scalability [21]

Security & Performance Security & Performance Security & Performance Accountability

Decentralization Fraud Detection [21] Non-repudiation [22], [23] Correctness [21], [23] Data Verifiability [23] Public ity/Fairness

verifiabil-

Correctness & Verifiability Correctness & Verifiability Correctness & Verifiability

[9] G. Lu, Y. Zhang, Z. Lu, J. Shao, and G. Wei, “Blockchain-based sealed-bid domain name auction protocol,” in Applied Cryptography in Computer and Communications, B. Chen and X. Huang, Eds. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021, pp. 25–38. [10] J. Gebele, T. Mutzel, B. Öz, and F. Matthes, “Sealed-bid auctions via tee-backed confidential compute blockchains,” in Proceedings of the 2025 Workshop on Decentralized Finance and Security, ser. DeFi ’25. ACM, Oct. 2025, p. 16–26. [Online]. Available: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3733815.3764043 [11] Z. Zhang, X. Lu, M. Li, J. An, Y. Yu, H. Yin, L. Zhu, Y. Liu, J. Liu, and B. Khoussainov, “A blockchain-based privacy-preserving scheme for sealed-bid auction,” IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 21, no. 5, pp. 4668–4683, 2024. [12] X. Dai, J. Liu, X. Liu, X. Tu, and R. Wang, “Secure blockchain bidding auction protocol against malicious adversaries,” High-Confidence Computing, vol. 4, no. 3, p. 100201, 2024. [Online]. Available: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667295224000047 [13] M. Bouaicha, G. Destefanis, T. Montanaro, N. Lasla, and L. Patrono, “Shill bidding prevention in decentralized auctions using smart contracts,” Information Sciences, vol. 718, p. 122374, 2025. [Online]. Available: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0020025525005067 [14] M. Kokaras and M. Foti, “The cost of privacy on blockchain: A study on sealed-bid auctions,” Blockchain: Research and Applications, vol. 4, no. 3, p. 100133, 2023. [Online]. Available:

General Framework Yes

SSI-based Framework Yes

Yes

Yes

Partially

Yes

Partially

Yes

No

Yes

Partially

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes (up to a TTP) Yes (up to a TTP) Partially

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes (up to a TTP) Yes

Yes Yes

Partially

Yes

Yes

Yes

Partially

Yes

Partially

Yes

Yes

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2096720923000088 [15] B. E. Diamond, “Many-out-of-many proofs and applications to anonymous zether,” in 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2021, pp. 1800–1817. [16] K. Chin, K. Emura, K. Omote, and S. Sato, “A sealed-bid auction with fund binding: Preventing maximum bidding price leakage,” in 2022 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain), 2022, pp. 398–405. [17] F. Zhang, D. Maram, H. Malvai, S. Goldfeder, and A. Juels, “Deco: Liberating web data using decentralized oracles for tls,” in Proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ser. CCS ’20. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2020, p. 1919–1938. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1145/3372297.3417239 [18] B. Chen, X. Li, T. Xiang, and P. Wang, “Sbrac: Blockchain-based sealed-bid auction with bidding price privacy and public verifiability,” Journal of Information Security and Applications, vol. 65, p. 103082, 2022. [Online]. Available: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214212621002635 [19] N. Tyagi, A. Arun, C. Freitag, R. Wahby, J. Bonneau, and D. Mazières, “Riggs: Decentralized sealed-bid auctions,” in Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ser. CCS ’23. New York, NY, USA: Association for Computing Machinery, 2023, p. 1227–1241. [Online]. Available: https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3623182

[20] L. Chen, F. Gao, Y. Bai, J. Wu, P. Zhou, and Z. Xu, “Privacypreserving blockchained edge resource auction with fraud resistance,” IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 4076–4089, 2024. [21] A. K. Vangujar, A. Umrani, J.-J. Chin, and P. Palmieri, “Secure eauctions: A blockchain-based cluster consensus identity-based identification scheme,” in 2024 6th International Conference on Blockchain Computing and Applications (BCCA), 2024, pp. 189–197. [22] A. E. Drăgnoiu and R. F. Olimid, “Towards an identity management solution on arweave,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.13865, 2024. [23] A. E. P. Drăgnoiu, A. Ciobanu, and R. F. Olimid, “On addressing isolation in blockchain-based self-sovereign identity,” in Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Systems Security and Privacy (ICISSP), vol. 1, 2026, pp. 257–264. [24] H. Li and W. Xue, “A blockchain-based sealed-bid e-auction scheme with smart contract and zero-knowledge proof,” Security and Communication Networks, vol. 2021, no. 1, p. 5523394, 2021. [25] W3C Recommendation, “Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) v1.0. Core architecture, data model, and representations,” 2022, https://www.w3.org/TR/did-core. Last Accessed: April 2026. [26] ——, “Verifiable Credentials Data Model v2,” 2026, https://www.w3.org/TR/vc-data-model-2.0. Last Accessed: April 2026.

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