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On the Role of Tie-Breaking Rules in the Convergence of Fictitious Play for Symmetric First-Price Auctions
We study continuous-time fictitious play in 2-bidder, symmetric first-price auctions with independently distributed discrete values and a discrete bid set. We first exhibit a minimal instance --- two bidders, two values, three positive bids --- on which fictitious play with the standard uniform-spli
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