Forging Self-Funded Marketplaces among Strategic Agents

[2608.14548] Forging Self-Funded Marketplaces among Strategic Agents Skip to main content Search Submit Donate Log in Search arXiv Press Enter to search · Advanced search Computer Science > Computer Science and Game Theory arXiv:2608.14548 (cs) [Submitted on 14 Aug 2026] Title: Forging Self-Funded Marketplaces among Strategic Agents Authors: Yuan Deng , Vasilis Gkatzelis , Xizhi Tan , Grigoris Velegkas , Song Zuo View a PDF of the paper titled Forging Self-Funded Marketplaces among Strategic Agents, by Yuan Deng and 4 other authors View PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract: We introduce the problem of designing mechanisms that incentivize strategic agents to form self-funded marketplaces. In our model, if agent $i$ exerts effort $x_i\in [0,1]$, they incur a cost of $x_i\cdot c_i$ (where $c_i$ is unknown to the mechanism designer) and they generate revenue $x_i\cdot r_i$; crucially, $c_i$ can be greater or smaller than $r_i$. Each effort profile $\mathbf{x}$ yields value $v(\mathbf{x})$ and the objective is to choose an effort vector that maximizes the value while ensuring that every agent $i$ receives a payment $p_i\geq x_i\cdot c_i$ and that $\mathbf{x}$ is budget-balanced, i.e., $\sum_{i} p_i \leq \sum_{i} x_i\cdot r_i$. This problem generalizes the well-studied budget-feasible mechanism design problem, where the requirement is that $\sum_{i} p_i \leq B$ for some predetermined budget $B$. To evaluate the performance of such mechanisms, we first consider the first-best benchmark (the optimal value achievable in the absence of any private information) and show that no truthful auction can achieve a bounded approximation of this benchmark. Also, even in restricted settings, no auction can achieve better than a logarithmic approximation. We complement these results by proposing a class of sequential auctions whose subgame perfect equilibria guarantee a logarithmic approximation of this benchmark. We then introduce an alternative benchmark, the maximin share (MMS), that better captures the thickness of the market and we provide an auction whose subgame perfect equilibria achieve a constant approximation of this benchmark. Comments: Extended Abstract accepted 27th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM EC 2026) Subjects: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) Cite as: arXiv:2608.14548 [cs.GT] (or arXiv:2608.14548v1 [cs.GT] for this version) https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2608.14548 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite Submission history From: Xizhi Tan [ view email ] [v1] Fri, 14 Aug 2026 17:59:38 UTC (78 KB) Full-text links: Access Paper: View a PDF of the paper titled Forging Self-Funded Marketplaces among Strategic Agents, by Yuan Deng and 4 other authors View PDF HTML (experimental) TeX Source view license Current browse context: cs.GT < prev | next > new | recent | 2026-08 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar export BibTeX citation Loading... BibTeX formatted citation × loading... Data provided by: Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer ( What is the Explorer? ) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers ( What is Connected Papers? ) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps ( What is Litmaps? ) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations ( What are Smart Citations? ) Code, Data, Media Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article alphaXiv Toggle alphaXiv ( What is alphaXiv? ) Links to Code Toggle CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers ( What is CatalyzeX? ) DagsHub Toggle DagsHub ( What is DagsHub? ) GotitPub Toggle Gotit.pub ( What is GotitPub? ) Huggingface Toggle Hugging Face ( What is Huggingface? ) ScienceCast Toggle ScienceCast ( What is ScienceCast? ) Demos Demos Replicate Toggle Replicate ( What is Replicate? ) Spaces Toggle Hugging Face Spaces ( What is Spaces? ) Spaces Toggle TXYZ.AI ( What is TXYZ.AI? ) Related Papers Recommenders and Search Tools Link to Influence Flower Influence Flower ( What are Influence Flowers? ) Core recommender toggle CORE Recommender ( What is CORE? ) Author Venue Institution Topic About arXivLabs arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs . Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax ( What is MathJax? ) We gratefully acknowledge support from our major funders , member institutions , , and all contributors. About · Help · Contact · Subscribe · Copyright · Privacy · Accessibility · Operational Status (opens in new tab) Major funding support from

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