Axiomatic Tools for Separating Electoral Control Types, with Applications to Concrete Systems

[2606.12039] Axiomatic Tools for Separating Electoral Control Types, with Applications to Concrete Systems Skip to main content Search Submit Donate Log in Computer Science > Computer Science and Game Theory arXiv:2606.12039 (cs) [Submitted on 10 Jun 2026 ( v1 ), last revised 24 Aug 2026 (this version, v2)] Title: Axiomatic Tools for Separating Electoral Control Types, with Applications to Concrete Systems Authors: Michael C. Chavrimootoo , Ian Clingerman , Ethan Ferland , Erin Gibson , Lane A. Hemaspaandra , Quan Luu , David E. Narváez , Yanfei Wang View PDF HTML (experimental) Abstract: Electoral control is the study of whether an attacker, by structural changes on an election such as adding/deleting/partitioning voters or candidates, can affect the winner in some desired way. Forty-four such attack types are often considered standard, and recently there has been work showing that sometimes the attack types -- though seemingly distinct---in fact "collapse," that is, for every input, either the attacker can achieve their goal under both of the control types or under neither of the control types. The papers doing this, however, while often exploiting axiomatic results that ensured collapses, found all the separations by human or computer-generated counterexamples. This left open the issue of whether even the separation direction can be driven by axiomatic results that allow large groups of separations to be almost automatically obtained. Our paper provides many such results, and we apply them to seven important voting systems, finding sixty-four new collapses and 1901 new separations. We not only give axiomatic sufficient conditions and one complete characterization result, but also identify some control-problem pairs that universally separate---in other words, they separate under every voting rule. Comments: Accepted at ADT 2026 Subjects: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) Cite as: arXiv:2606.12039 [cs.GT] (or arXiv:2606.12039v2 [cs.GT] for this version) https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2606.12039 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite Submission history From: Michael C. Chavrimootoo [ view email ] [v1] Wed, 10 Jun 2026 13:04:28 UTC (86 KB) [v2] Mon, 24 Aug 2026 22:00:20 UTC (87 KB) Full-text links: Access Paper: View PDF HTML (experimental) TeX Source view license Additional Features Audio Summary Current browse context: cs.GT < prev | next > new | recent | 2026-06 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations SciX Google Scholar Semantic Scholar export BibTeX citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer ( What is the Explorer? ) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers ( What is Connected Papers? ) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps ( What is Litmaps? ) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations ( What are Smart Citations? ) Code, Data, Media Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article alphaXiv Toggle alphaXiv ( What is alphaXiv? ) Links to Code Toggle CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers ( What is CatalyzeX? ) DagsHub Toggle DagsHub ( What is DagsHub? ) GotitPub Toggle Gotit.pub ( What is GotitPub? ) Huggingface Toggle Hugging Face ( What is Huggingface? ) ScienceCast Toggle ScienceCast ( What is ScienceCast? ) Demos Demos Replicate Toggle Replicate ( What is Replicate? ) Spaces Toggle Hugging Face Spaces ( What is Spaces? ) Spaces Toggle TXYZ.AI ( What is TXYZ.AI? ) Related Papers Recommenders and Search Tools Link to Influence Flower Influence Flower ( What are Influence Flowers? ) Core recommender toggle CORE Recommender ( What is CORE? ) Author Venue Institution Topic About arXivLabs arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs . Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax ( What is MathJax? ) We gratefully acknowledge support from our major funders , member institutions , and all contributors. About · Help · Contact · Subscribe · Copyright · Privacy · Accessibility · Operational Status (opens in new tab)

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