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How Seriously Should We Take AI Welfare? Constraints from the Epistemology of Consciousness

Lennon, Preston · 2026
PhilArchive · Papers · 2026
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philosophy
Some philosophers argue that near-term AI systems might soon be welfare subjects. We should take AI welfare seriously, they urge, because AI systems might soon have properties indicated by our best scientific theories of consciousness, and consciousness suffices for welfare subjectivity. I argue that this view faces constraints from the epistemology of consciousness. Specifically, I argue that there is an enormous gap in justification between our first-personal beliefs of consciousness in ourselves and our third-personal, theoretical belief of what consciousness is according to contemporary consciousness science. The science of consciousness is so in its infancy that it is doubtful that the set of theories currently on offer is exhaustive. In contrast, beliefs about the fact that we are conscious are, famously, among the most epistemically secure we can have. Our taking AI welfare seriously, in terms of action or policy, will be constrained by these considerations from the epistemology of consciousness.
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