Varieties of Normative Explanation

Normative inquiry may pursue several different explanatory projects. We may seek to explain why the right acts are right or why the things that are good for us are so, explain what it is for something to be obligatory, or explain the source of reasons for action. This chapter takes steps towards understanding this variety. After laying some general ground about explanation and normativity, I map out some key axes of debate about first-order normative explanation, including the role of normative principles and the nature of the explanatory relation. I discuss the role of explanation in normative inquiry, its relation to grounding in metaphysics and unification in philosophy of science, and explanatory pluralism. I conclude with the other two explanatory projects, concerning the foundations of classes of normative phenomena (such as moral facts or practical reasons) and the natures of individual normative properties, and their relation to first-order normative explanation.