Dissociative Catalysts of Coherence Loss: Impairment of World-Model Maintenance in Cognitive Constructivism

Dissociative psychoactive substances (such as ketamine and PCP) present a challenge to standard models of altered states of consciousness. Unlike classical hallucinogens which enrich or distort conscious content, dissociatives induce a peculiar fragility in the construction of one’s world-model – a breakdown of the high-level coherence that ordinarily binds perception, selfhood, and meaning. This paper develops a Cognitive Constructivist framework to argue that dissociation is best understood as a selective impairment of global world-model maintenance, rather than a mere perceptual suppression or hallucination. We contrast dissociative states with the tightened models of anxiety and the loosened models of psychedelic hallucinosis, proposing a taxonomy of altered states in terms of model dynamics: tightening, loosening, and destabilization. We explore how normal perception and self-experience depend on energetically costly top-down integration, and how NMDA-antagonist dissociatives disrupt this process – weakening long-range neural integration and thalamocortical coordination without extinguishing basic sensory consciousness. The phenomenology of dissociation (e.g. loss of meaning, depersonalization, “empty” awareness) is examined in light of this framework, revealing that awareness can persist even as the “world” (the unified field of meaningful experience) collapses. Philosophical implications are drawn for theories of consciousness and self: dissociative states illustrate consciousness separated from both narrative content and stable self-model. We argue that while dissociation might superficially resemble a mystical “pure consciousness,” it in fact represents an unstable minimal modeling that lacks the meta-awareness and integration of genuine contemplative states. Clinically, reconceptualizing dissociative anesthesia and rapid-acting antidepressant use (e.g. ketamine for depression) as world-model interruptions suggests the need for careful therapeutic integration. Rather than insight or content-driven therapy, dissociative interventions may work by resetting rigid pathological models – a destabilization that must be followed by deliberate reconstruction of meaning. We conclude that dissociative catalysts, far from revealing an alternate reality, expose the fragile and effortful nature of constructing the reality we take for granted.