Why Moore isn’t a Boltzmann Brain?

Contemporary thermodynamic research has discovered that our universe is filled with "Boltzmann Brains"—disembodied minds arising from random particle collisions. Moreover, the number of Boltzmann Brains is virtually infinite compared to human brains. From a probabilistic standpoint, this suggests that we are far more likely to be Boltzmann Brains rather than human beings—an unsettling skeptical scenario that we are reluctant to accept. In response, various approaches have been proposed to refute Boltzmann Brain skepticism. For instance, Dogramaci and Schoenfield (2025) argue from the perspective of “Bayesian Belief Updating”, while Mozersky (2025) explores the implications of “Infinite Sets”. This paper formalizes and reconstructs these recent approaches, revealing that each contains significant logical flaws. Consequently, contemporary attempts to counter Boltzmann Brain skepticism remain unsuccessful. In contrast, this paper challenges the “Probabilistic Typicality” assumption that underlies Boltzmann Brain arguments, asserting that human brains and Boltzmann Brains differ not only in external conditions but also in the fundamental nature of conscious experience. Ultimately, this paper adopts an approach akin to that of G.E. Moore, defending an anti-skeptical position through an analysis of daily phenomenological experience.