Human Nature, Belonging, and Non-Arbitrariness

This article develops an ontological synthesis of the debate on human nature through the lens of the Philosophy of Belonging, proposing that the human being is constituted by relational and institutional orders of belonging rather than by an ontologically isolated individual. It critically reviews canonical traditions (Hobbesian conflict theory, liberalism, Kantian autonomy, neoclassical economics, and psychological theories of motivation and attachment) and integrates contemporary relational approaches such as recognition theory, communitarianism, social ontology, and republican non-domination. The central thesis is that belonging is not merely a social good but a constitutive condition of the self, and that freedom is best understood as non-arbitrariness within stable and revisable orders of belonging. Within this framework, individual creativity emerges as an enabled and distributed institutional capacity rather than as an exogenous individual trait. Authentic belonging does not homogenize individuals; instead, it protects productive difference and transforms dissent and innovation into collective resources for social dynamism, competitiveness, and institutional learning. The article introduces a comparative ontological matrix of theories of human nature, freedom, institutions, and creativity, demonstrating that non-arbitrary belonging generates effective freedom, psychological security, and adaptive social change. The Philosophy of Belonging is presented as an ontological turn that bridges individual agency and relational constitution, offering a unified framework for understanding identity, institutional design, distributed creativity, and long-term social survival in environments of accelerated global change.