From Moral Judgment to Confessed Authority

This paper argues that moral judgment is intelligible only under confessed authority. Ethical discourse routinely assumes that obligation, judgment, and accountability can be sustained through reason, consensus, outcomes, or procedure, yet such approaches fail to account for the authority required to bind conscience legitimately. When ethical reasoning is pressed to its own limits, it reveals the necessity of an authority that cannot be constructed, negotiated, or inferred without contradiction. This paper contends that such authority must be revealed rather than discovered, personal rather than abstract, and ultimate rather than provisional. Moral authority is therefore identified as divine authority, personally revealed and exercised in Jesus Christ, and mediated through Scripture as the final court of moral appeal. The framework advanced—Theological Propositional Ethics—maintains strict jurisdictional ordering: philosophy may disclose the necessity of authority, but only theology can confess it. The denial of confessed authority does not eliminate moral judgment; it relocates it into power. Ethics stands or falls with the authority it acknowledges. ________________________________________