“The problem of the relation of mind and matter can be completely solved” (Russell 1959)

One hears a great deal about “Russellian physicalism”, “Russellian panpsychism”, and “Russellian monism”. They’re proposed as solutions to the so-called mind–body problem. There is, however, a great deal of unclarity about Russell’s views on this matter. This is partly his own fault. It’s well known that he endorses “neutral monism”, but he’s also prepared to call himself a materialist or physicalist, and at one point claims to nd himself “driven to a position not unlike that of Berkeley without his God”; and, in all this, he claims to have “completely solved” the mind–body problem. This chapter argues that Russell has good reason to make this last claim, and it defends his self-understanding: (1) he is indeed a neutral monist, as he understands the term; (2) he is indeed a materialist and a physicalist, in the original and best senses of these terms; and (3) he is an outright realist about consciousness who takes it that one knows something of the intrinsic nature of the physical simply in having conscious experience. (4) He is also consistently open to the idea that some form of panpsychism is true, while remaining ofcially agnostic.