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A Posteriori Russellian Physicalism, Revealed
Physicalism is an attractive ontological view and revelation, the thesis that phenomenal concepts reveal the essence of phenomenal properties, is an attractive view of phenomenal concepts. I argue that neither orthodox Russellian nor type-B physicalism can reconcile physicalism with revelation. I then introduce a new view, a posteriori Russellian Physicalism, and show that it can succeed where they fail.
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