On the Ordinary Concept of Intelligence

[This is a short version of an on-going longer project] Attributions of intelligence affect political discourse (Hartman et al., 2023; Knöchelmann & Cohrs, 2024; Oktar & Lombrozo, 2026; Stanley et al., 2020), perceptions of animals’ moral standing (Piazza et al., 2014; Ruby & Heine, 2012; Sytsma & Machery, 2012), and perceptions of AI (Joo, 2024; Ladak et al., 2024). Thus, it matters how people tend to attribute intelligence. The folk psychology of intelligence, however, does not figure prominently in discussions of folk psychology (Andrews, 2012; Fodor, 1987; Goldman, 2006; Nichols & Stich, 2003; Stich, 1983), and researchers have yet to extensively investigate this topic empirically. Here, we experimentally investigate whether people attribute intelligence differently across different types of activities and their practitioners, depending on whether the activities are intellectual or embodied. In three experiments, we find evidence for the Differential Use Hypothesis.