Informational Experiential Realism: From Thin Subjects to Continuing Process-Subjects

Galen Strawson provides an explicit physical process-subject identity: an experience, its thin subject, its content, and a bounded physical synergy are one occurrence. This insight removes the need for an enduring owner standing behind experience, but Strawson's criterion makes a thin subject highly dependent on its exact experiential and physical parts. It therefore leaves open whether a subject can remain numerically one through substantial changes of content and material participation. This paper develops a continuing process-subject alternative. A token Unified Experiential Field operation is proposed as numerically identical with one total experience-as-process and one experiential subject. Its identity is fixed not by a permanent inventory of matter or contents but by the uninterrupted continuation of one locally bounded, self-producing, history-bearing, non-factorizable causal-modal operation. A five-condition continuity relation permits participant turnover, reorganization, and boundary migration while rejecting branching identity, identity by fusion, and survival through genuine operational cessation. A typed physical domain, bilateral binding criterion, and concrete causal-modal interpretation constrain the proposal against arbitrary boundary selection and Newman-style structural triviality. The account also rejects the inference from complete physical determination to experiential constituent inheritance. A macroexperience can be wholly physical without being phenomenally composed from microsubjects. Informational Experiential Realism therefore avoids the constitutive panpsychist combination problem rather than solving it on panpsychist terms. The positive identity claim remains abductive. Qualitative correspondence, empirical attribution, competition from constitution and realization theories, and the Russellian intrinsic-nature challenge remain open.