Contradiction and God Between Neoplatonism and the Byzantine Tradition: Proclus, Pseudo-Dionysius, and Nicholas of Methone

Within the Byzantine Christian tradition, one commonly finds affirmative and negative predicates equally applied to God—for example, “God is Being-itself” and “God is not Being-itself”—suggesting a suspension of the Principle of Non-Contradiction (PNC). Byzantines in large part draw on the Pseudo-Dionysius (~6th-cent. CE) for this position, who was in large part influenced by the later Neoplatonist Proclus (5th cent. CE) who, by contrast, maintained the PNC by referring to the first cause (i.e. the One) in terms of negations alone (e.g. “the One is not Being”). In attempting to justify Ps.-Dionysius’ position, the 12th-cent. Byzantine Nicholas of Methone critiqued Proclus’ position on the first cause, explicitly arguing for the suspension of the PNC in allowing for negative and positive predications about God. This chapter closely analyzes how we get from Proclus’ affirmation of the PNC to Nicholas of Methone’s suspension of the PNC when referring to the first cause, looking closely at Pseudo-Dionysius as a key figure behind Nicholas’ position. An important, additional background for Ps.-Dionysius is Damascius, who, in contrast to Proclus, argues that the One implies the opposite, positive attributes that come after it, suggesting both affirmative and negative properties predicated of it. Damascius thus suggests what Ps.-Dionysius affirms and what Nicholas of Methone makes explicit in his critique of Proclus, giving us the background for understanding the Byzantine view on contradictory affirmations made about the first cause.