The Rationality of Belonging: Cognitive Crises and Epistemic Clash within a Science and Religion Belief System

Doxastic conflicts are a pervasive feature of modern human experience. We form beliefs on various interrelated subjects that, not rarely, conflict with each other. In this paper, I argue that when an individual experiences a crisis between doxastic attitudes toward science and religion, there may be a deeper issue than just a disharmony among beliefs. There may be a higher-order clash between two distinct norms of rationality, which provides a robust account for why doxastic conflicts of this nature are widespread and challenging to resolve. I employ concepts from social epistemology to elucidate the nature of the epistemic clash and to explore possible resolutions. First, I characterize a hypothetical conflict between an agent's scientific and religious beliefs. Second, I introduce three categories from contemporary debates in social epistemology: epistemic dependence, expertise, and epistemic community. Third, employing these categories, I characterize the high-order conflict that an agent may experience between two distinct norms of rationality. Fourth, I describe four asymmetries between scientific and religious doxastic attitudes that bear importance to rationality. Fifth, from these asymmetries, I suggest a course of action that an agent may take to mitigate their cognitive uneasiness and move towards a more integrated rational profile.