An Ontic Structural Realist Response to Underdetermination in Quantum Mechanics

Laura Ruetsche (2024) argues that the underdetermination problem is trouble for realists because, if there is no “winning interpretation” of QM, realists cannot execute the conclusion of the No Miracles Argument (NMA). In this paper, I will offer a realist response to Ruetsche’s argument. My response has two parts. In the first part, I argue that what motivates realists to believe in QM is not a matter of interpretation but of explanation. In part two, I argue for an ontic structural realist view that allows realists to execute the conclusion of the NMA, contra Ruetsche, without a winning interpretation of QM. For simplicity’s sake, our discussion will be restricted to non-relativistic QM. (Note that this manuscript is unpublished and in progress.)