The Problem of Other AI Minds

(Substantially revised as of August 24, 2026.) Are we in position to warrantedly establish whether a given artificial intelligence (AI) system is conscious? In short, can we warrantedly establish whether there is AI Consciousness (AIC)? Here we aim to consider this question from the perspective of the traditional problem of other minds—the philosophical problematic which has been specifically directed at the question of whether and how we might come to be warranted in taking some other entity to have conscious mentality. More specifically: for each of the traditional strategies of response to this problem, we argue that even granting that the strategy works to establish that other humans and certain non-human animals (and perhaps even certain aliens) are conscious, the prospect of the strategy’s working to establish that there is AIC is unlikely. Moreover, we argue, the failure of the traditional strategies to apply to the case of AI systems does not in itself support thinking that there is not AIC, in part for reasons which are central to generating the problem of other minds. The upshot is that there a distinctively difficult problem of other AI minds, whose lack of principled resolution offers a new line of support for what McClelland (2025) calls ‘agnosticism about artificial consciousness’.