The Self-Grounding of Existence-as-Totality

Paper Type Foundational Meta-Paper / General Paper of the WTS (Wangius Thought System) Philosophical discussions of existence have traditionally focused on the explanation of particular entities, the causal structure within the world, or the comparative grounding of competing theoretical frameworks. Yet a more fundamental question has rarely been confronted in a systematic and explicit manner: Does Existence-as-Totality require an external ground, and is such grounding even possible? This paper addresses the problem at this prior, meta-logical level. It first clarifies that Existence-as-Totality is neither a collection, nor a sum, nor a maximal object, but a limit concept characterized by ontological non-externality. As the necessary precondition for any explanation, theory, or judgment, Existence-as-Totality cannot coherently be treated as an object awaiting external grounding. On this basis, the paper conducts a structural analysis of the concept of External Grounding. It demonstrates that, regardless of whether such grounding is formulated in metaphysical, logical, or theoretical terms, the assumption of external grounding invariably presupposes that Existence-as-Totality is explanatorily non-self-sufficient. Further analysis shows that every attempt to externally ground Existence-as-Totality leads, at the structural level, to conceptual collapse, infinite regress, or the self-cancellation of explanatory activity itself. The impossibility of external grounding is therefore not an empirical limitation, but a consequence internal to the concept of Existence-as-Totality. Once the possibility of external grounding is excluded, while recognizing that the validity of Existence-as-Totality cannot be coherently denied, the paper argues that Existence-as-Totality can only be understood as self-grounding. Here, Self-Grounding does not denote psychological self-evidence, nor propositional or systemic self-proof, but a structural necessity: the fact that Existence-as-Totality does not depend on any external ground in order to be valid. The paper further argues that the Self-Grounding of Existence-as-Totality does not constitute a particular ontological position, but rather a precondition for the admissibility of all ontological positions. It should therefore be established as a First Philosophical Principle. This principle does not terminate philosophical inquiry; instead, it marks an unavoidable starting point that allows philosophical explanation to proceed without recourse to illegitimate forms of external grounding.