Referential Deflationism: Eliminating Phenomenal Consciousness via Self-Modelling

This essay develops Referential Deflationism, an eliminativist theory that argues that "consciousness" is a name given to a required but ontologically empty reference point that emerges purely from the structure of cybernetic machines. I will argue: (1) Cognition requires temporal extension and memory-scaffolding, eliminating any phenomenal instant. (2) Perceptions and thoughts aren't separate ontological categories, but identical processes. (3) Complex cognition requires a reference point that is computationally necessary but ontologically empty, analogous to a coordinate origin. (4) The self is a contingently chosen reference, selected for stability, availability, and utility, not metaphysical necessity. (5) Several anti-physicalist arguments (Mary's Room, Zombies) can be answered within this framework. The intuition of the conscious self is undeniable and is preserved as an output of meta-self-modelling, not as evidence of phenomenal character. If the argument holds, consciousness becomes a structural feature of self-modelling systems and there is no phenomenon requiring explanation.