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El concepto de representación en la filosofía de Hegel
Up to the time of the first edition of Hegel's Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences (1817), the three forms of theoretical spirit were feeling, representation, and thought. Since the second edition, Hegel corrects the first extreme of this division: the three theoretical forms become intuition, representation and thought. The displacement of the dividing line between the fírst and second phase of intelligence, i.e. the alteration of their extent, depends on a modification of their concepts. The purpose of this article is to focus on the borderline of the different theoretical forms and, in doing so, to define the concept of representation, i.e. to point out the distinctive trait that specifies intelligence as representative.
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